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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STA T'E Q:F UTAH 
srrATE OF U~rAI-I, 
Plat'ntiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
'VALLACE PLUM:, 
Defendant-A ppella;nt. 
Case 
No. 9731 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant was convicted of burglary in the 
third degree upon his plea of guilty and thereafter 
moved the court to set aside his plea of guilty and enter 
a plea of not guilty. It is from the denial of the motion 
to withdraw the plea of guilty that defendant has 
appealed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied the appellant's motion to 
set aside his plea of guilty, made after judgment had 
been entered, appellant sentenced, and a commitment to 
the State Prison issued. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT 0~ APPEAL 
The State of Utah contends that the trial court 
should be affirmed in its ruling refusing to allow appel-
lant to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S 
The appellant, after full preliminary hearing, was 
arraigned on the charge of third degree burglary on 
lVfarch 30, 1962 and entered a plea of not guilty (R. 4)~ 
Trial was set upon the charge on :May 10, 1962. On May 
10, 1962, the appellant appeared before the court, with 
counsel, and announced that he desired to change his 
plea. The court permitted the appellant to withdraw his 
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, the appellant entered a 
plea of guilty and the court referred the matter to the 
D'epartment of Adult Probation and Parole for a pre-
sentence report (R. 21). On lVlay 25, 1962, the appellant 
came before the court for pronouncement of sentence 
(R. 23). The appellant's counsel was allowed to make a 
statement in his behalf, in which he requested probation. 
The appellant responded to questions the court put to 
him. During the course of the hearing on the sentence, 
the following occurred : 
''[:MR. WADE:] I would like to recommend 
to the Court that he be placed on probation. It 
is my understanding that the District Attorney's 
office will also make that recommendation to the 
Court. 
MR. IVINS: I am sorry I didn't understand 
that. 
MR. 'VADE: I think it's my understanding 
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that the Distriet Attorney's office ,,·ould make that 
recommendation to the Court? 
nlR. IYINS: 'l,he State does recommend pro-
bation in this rase, Your Honor." 
(R. 23) 
The court, however, noted that the appellant had a 
prior criminal record and, being advised as to the appel-
lanes record, the court sentenced him to the State Prison. 
On the same day, :May 25, 1962, the appellant was com-
mitted to the State Prison. On the 31st of May, 1962, 
a motion to allow the appellant to withdraw his plea of 
guilty was prepared along with two affidavits in support 
of the motion; and on June 1, 1962, they were filed with 
the clerk of the court (R. 6-10). 
The appellant's motion requested withdrawal of the 
plea of guilty ''on the grounds and for the reason that 
said plea was induced to be entered by promises and 
representations of the State that the defendant would 
be placed on probation if he would enter such a plea." 
(R. 6). The affidavit of the appellant's counsel, however, 
shows a different fact situation (R. 7). Paragraphs 3, 
5 and 6 thereof state the following: 
"3. That in the course of these conversa-
tions, Mr. Ivins approached said Norman Wade, 
the deponent herein, with the proposition that if 
the defendant herein would plead 'guilty' to the 
charge of third degree burglary against him, that 
he would recommen.d to the probation department 
and also to the judge that Mr. Plum be placed on 
probation. 1\Ir. Ivins further represented that on 
this recommendation there would be a very good 
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chance that Mr. Plum would be placed on pro-
bation. 
* * * 
"5. That Mr. Wade advised Mr. Plum that 
he had a case that was very difficult to win in 
light of what deponent knew; and that under 
the circumstances l\fr. \Vade felt that it was best 
that he plead 'guilty' to this charge, as it was 
probably the only possibility he had to get pro-
bation, and Mr. Wade had been assured by Mr. 
Ivins that the chance was very good for probation. 
"6. Upon this representation and upon the 
persuasion of Norman Wade, ~ir. Plum finally 
agreed to plead 'guilty' to the charge, but Mr. 
Plum did not at any time state to Mr. Wade that 
he was guilty at any time." 
Further, the appellant's affidavit recited the follow-
ing (R. 9): 
"That prior to the trial of the cause, his 
attorney, Norman Wade, came to him with an 
offer from the State, that if he would plead 
guilty to the cause, that the State would recom-
mend probation for him to both the probation 
department and to the sentencing judge; and 
that in lright of this, he would in likelihood be 
granted probation, and placed on probation.***" 
(Emphasis added.) 
On June 29, 1962, a hearing wa::s held before Judge 
R. L. Tuckett on the appellant's 1notion to set aside the 
ple1a of guiUy. The appellant testified that he was 23 
years old, ahnost 2-t, had con1pleted the tenth grade, and 
was working for the State Road Connnission at the 
time of the occurrence of the criminal incident (R. 20). 
The appellant testified as to his presence at the burglary, 
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but denied knowledge or participation. He did not testify 
as to any of the 1natter that allegedly induced his plea 
of guilty. Further, at the time of argu1nent on the 
motion, appellant's counsel stated: 
"* * * In the course of the preparation for 
trial he was offered this partic1tlar hope that if 
he would plead guilty he would have a recom-
mendation from the prosec'tdin,g attorney's office 
to both the parole department and the sentencing 
judge he be placed on parole probation, * * *." 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 22, p. 10). 
Further, the record shows the following statement 
by the prosecutor (R. 22, p. 12) : 
"Your Honor, 1n order that the record may 
be straight in this matter, the facts as they evolved 
prior to the entry of plea were these: Mr. Wade 
came to n1y office and said he thought he had a 
very difficult case, and with the evidence that I 
had I was inclined to agree. He said, 'What 
would the State do in this case if we changed 
our plea to enter a plea of guilty~' I said, •In 
view of the Defendant's age, if he's not been con-
victed of a previous felony, I will give you my 
assurance as the assistant prosecutor that I will 
recommend probation.' Now, I have had Mr. 
Roundy dig out the minutes of his reporter's 
notes of the proceedings at which Mr. Plum was 
sentenced and they definitely reveal that this 
promise was kept; that the assistant prosecutor 
did recon1mend probation. In spite of this the 
court, in view of the man's long record of arrests 
without convictions, felt that a judgment of the 
statutory sentence should be imposed. * * *" 
l\[r. vVade then agreed that this statement was cor-
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rect (R. 22, p. 13). The court eonnnented at the time of 
the hearing R. 22, p. 11) : 
"The difficulty with this situation is that it'~5 
a matter of bargaining. The Defendant entered 
a plea of guilty and then when he gets a judgment 
he doesn't like it." 
Thereafter, the court denied the appellant's motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY 
WHERE IT WAS MADE AFTER JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
AND COMMITMENT. 
It is submitted that the trial court could properly 
have denied the appellant's motion on the grounds that 
it could not entertain such a motion under Section 77-24-3, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. This section provides: 
"A plea of guilty can be put in only by the 
defendant himself, in open court, except upon 
information or indichnent against a corporation, 
in which case it 1nay be put in by counsel. The 
court may at any time before judgment, upon a 
plea of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn and a 
plea of not guilty substituted." 
Thus, the plain language of the statute indicates 
that defendant will only be allowed to withdraw his 
plea before judgment is entered. If it were construed 
to allow him to withdraw his plea at any time, the word8 
'·'before judgment" would be superf-luous. It is a general 
legal Inaxiin of statutory construction that meaning 
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should be given to all the words of a statute if possible. 
Thus, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed. Vol. 
2, Sec. -1:705, notes : 
'• It is an ele1nentary rule of construction 
that effect must be given, if possible, to every 
word, clause and sentence of a statute. A statute 
should be construed so that effect is given to all 
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative 
or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that 
one section will not destroy another unless the 
provision is the result of obvious mistake or 
error." 
Applying the above rule to Section 77-24-3, l"T.C.A. 
1953, it would appear that the court could not consider 
a motion under that statute after the appellant in this 
case had been adjudged guilty, sentenced and committed. 
The State recognizes that there is a split of authority 
on the issue as to when a judgment can be withdrawn, 
22 C.J.S., Crimt'nal Law, 421( 4), p. 1155; 4 "'Wharton's 
Criminal Law and Procedure 1909. However, the State 
submits that states having similar statutes to that of 
Utah have recognized the b~ter rule to be that after 
judgment, such motions are not proper. The Arizona 
statute is similar to that of Utah, and in St.(l)te v. Tela-
vera, 76 Ariz. 183, 261 P. 2d 997 (1953), the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that the plea of guilty of a 17 year 
old rapist could not be set aside after commitment. 
The Arizona court stated : 
"It will be seen that the authority of the court 
to permit a withdrawal of a plea of guilty is 
limited to the period prior to the pronouncement 
of sentence and even then it is discretionary with 
the court. In the instant case the defendant was 
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sentenced on August 13. The judgment of com-
mitment and the statement of facts required by 
law to accompany the judgment committing the 
defendant to the state penitentiary were signed 
by the trial judge on that date. \Vhile the record 
does not show upon what date defendant was 
received at the penitentiary it is reasonable to 
assume that he was committed thereto soon after 
August 13 and certainly long before September 
12. When the court denied defendant's motion 
to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a 
plea of not guilty, he had long before that time 
entered upon the execution of his sentence. There-
fore in addition to the above statutory limitation 
upon the power of the court to permit the with-
drawal of a plea of guilty and enter a plea of 
not guilty it is enjoined from doing so after 
defendant had entered upon the execution of his 
sentence under the rule laid down in State v. 
Mcl{elvey, 30 Ariz. 265, 246 P. 550." 
The California court has adopted a similar rule 
based on the California statute1 which is the same as 
Utah's. People v. Grgurevich, 153 Cal. App. 2d 806, 315 
P. 2d 39'1 (1957). Thus in People v. TVade, 53 Cal. 2d 
322, 348 P. 2d 116 (1959), a unanimous Califon1ia 
Supreme Court held that after judgn1ent, coram nobis 
was the appropriate remedy. The court stated: 
"The record reveals that at the hearing set to 
order the execution of sentence, after judgment 
had been rendered, the defendant attempted to 
withdraw her plea of guilty. She was not jorined 
by counsel in this attempt. The trial court prop-
erly ruled that it had no jurisdiction to entertain 
1Cal. Penal Code, Sec. 1018. This statute is also cited in appellant's 
brief. 
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such a motion after judgrnent had been entered. 
( J>Pn. Code, §1018.) As the case is being remanded 
to the trial court as to this defendant in any 
event, she will be free to petition for a writ of 
error coram nobis, the proper procedure for a 
defendant seeking to obtain leave to withdraw a 
plea of guilty after judgment." 348 P. 2d at 128. 
Iowa has so ruled with an apparently similar statute, 
lmra Code 1950, Sec. 777.15; State v. Harper, 220 Iowa 
315, :258 N.W. 886 (1935). See also Commonwe,alth v. 
Pllchw, :271 :\lass. 21, 171 N.E. 53 (1930), and Common-
lccalth v. Dascalakis, 246 ~Iass. 12, 140 N.E. 470 (1923), 
also refusing to allow such relief. The New Jersey court 
in State v. Oats, 32 N.J. Super 435, 108 A. 2d 641 (1954), 
held that it would only grant relief after judgment if 
habeas corpus or coram nobis would lie. 
It does not appear that this Court has ruled on the 
l~tah statute, since in State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P. 
2d 8:23 (1932), the Court denied the defendant's motion 
where it was presented prior to entry of a corrected 
sentence. It is submitted that, based upon the clear 
statutory language and the above court rulings, the 
rtah statute should be construed as not allowing the 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty after judgrnent. Certainly 
finality of judgments should be accorded recognition 
and an accused should not be allowed to gamble with the 
court's time and power. It is submitted that the Legis-
lature foresaw just such circumstances as those of the 
instant case and desired to foreclose the court from 
being besieged with motions from defendants who, having 
plead to the charge, disliked the consequences. 
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Additionally, it should be noted that in 1935 the 
American Law Institute recommended enactment of a 
Model Code of ·Criminal Procedure. Therein, the Utah 
statute was cited in support of the proposition that a 
withdrawal could be had by an accused but withdrawal 
was limited to pre-sentence motions. It is, therefore, 
submitted that the motion of the appellant, coming after 
judgment, sentence and commitment, was not timely. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING 77-24-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA 
OF GUILTY AFTER JUDGMENT, THE TRIAL COURT HAD 
DISCRETION TO GRANT OR DENY THE MOTION, AND 
IT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
In St.ate v. Lee Lim, supra, the Utah court held that 
the trial court had discretion under what is now Section 
77 -24-9·, U.C.A. 1953, to grant or deny a motion to with-
draw a plea of guilty prior to final judgment. If it be 
determined that the above referenced statute does not 
prohibit such motions after judgment, the same rule, 
that of discretion vested in the trial court, would apply. 
Thus, in 146 A.L.R. 1431, the rule ris stated: 
''In a number of cases the appellate courts, 
without referring to any particular statute, have 
held that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, 
after the plea has been received by the court 
and judg1nent entered thereon, is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and that 
the action of the court on such motion will not 
be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is 
shown." 
1{) 
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See also, 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 421(2); Abbott, 
()rimin(ltl Trial Practice, ±th Ed., Sec. 118. Thus, it 
becomes necessary to determine whether or not, based 
on the facts of the instant case, the trial court abused 
its discretion. The appellant has cited the general rule 
that where fraud, duress or some official overreacillng 
is manifest, a court should set aside a plea of guilty. 
However, in the instant case, there is no evidence of 
fraud, duress or unlawful action. At best, the evidence 
shows that the Assistant District Attorney offered to 
merely make a recommendation of probation for appel-
lant, which was done. There was no firm promise that 
probation would be granted, nor did the prosecutor fail 
to keep his pr01nise. Further, the appellant in his affi-
davit makes it clear that he was under no misappre-
hension of law or fact, for it recites as a fact the under-
standing that the State would only "recommend pro-
bation," and a ''likelihood" of it being obtained (R. 9). 
Additionally, the appellant acted after thoughtful advice 
of counsel and deliberation. Appellant was not a minor, 
immature, nor inexperienced in matters of criminal law. 
It clearly appears that he was aware of the consequences 
of his plea. Appellant's testimony on the merits of the 
case can hardly be called obviously exculpatory. Thus, 
there are no facts warranting a conclusion of official 
overreaching. State v. Spiers, 12 U. 2d 14, 361 P. 2d 509 
(1961). 
At best, the record discloses that appellant, con-
cluding that his case was most probably without merit 
for trial, plead guilty on advice of counsel, with full 
understanding of the consequences along with the hope 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that he would receive probation. This is clearly not a 
sufficient basis to claim that the plea should be with-
drawn or that the trial judge abused his discretion in 
not allowing appellant to withdraw his plea. Thus, in 
22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 421(3)e, it is said: 
"It is frequently stated that the mere fact 
that accused, knowing his rights and the con-
sequences of his act, hoped or believed that by 
pleading guilty he would receive a shorter sen-
tence or a milder punishment than that which 
would fall to his lot after trial and conviction 
by jury, presents no ground for the withdrawal 
of his plea or the exercise of the court's discre-
tion, and some authorities state the rule more 
broadly so as to include a case where accused 
was led so to hope or believe by his counsel or 
anyone else. It has been held that the court does 
not abuse its discretion in denying leave to with-
draw a guilty plea even though such plea was 
induced by the prosecution's promise with respect 
to its recommendation as to sentence and the 
court refused to follow such recommendation.'' 
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 118, 
notes: 
"The nwre fact that an accused, knowing his 
rights and the consequences of his act, hoped or 
believed, or \Yas led to believe, that he would 
receive shorter sentence or a milder punishment, 
or some other favor, by entering a plea of guilty, 
than that which would fall to his lot after trial 
and conviction by a jury, presents no ground for 
pennittt'ng the withdrawal of the plea of guilty." 
In Futtennan v. Cnited States, 202 F.2d 185 (D.C. 
Cir. 1952), the court determined that no basis existed for 
12 
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granting withdrawal of a plea of guilty because of advice 
of counsel and accompanied by an expectancy of proba-
tion. Tlw court stated: 
• • And based upon that record, we are in 
complete agreement with the trial judge that ap-
pellants were fully advised by 'able and vigorous 
counsel' as well as by the court concerning the 
charges against them. As to counsel's representa-
tion concerning probation, they were clearly those 
of hope and not of promise. Thus appellants failed 
to prove that the withdrawals of their guilty pleas 
were necessary in order to 'correct manifest in-
justice.' " 
In a case almost identical with the instant case, the 
facts were held to afford no basis for relief by the Su-
preme Court of Illinois. People v. Enso~, 319 Ill. 255, 
149 N.E. 737 (1925 ). The accused contended he plead 
guilty to burglary upon advice of counsel and upon prom-
ises of the prosecutor that he would recommend proba-
tion and, further, he contended that he had a meritorious 
defense. The court denied the appellant's contention, 
noting: 
'' * * * The above cases also recognize the rule 
that, if an accused, knowing his rights and the 
consequences of his act, hopes or believes that by 
pleading guilty he will receive a shorter sentence 
or milder punishment or some other favor than 
he would upon a trial and conviction by a jury, 
he has no right to withdraw his plea of guilty if 
the sentence or punishment i1nposed upon him by 
the court is not what he hoped or believed it 
would be. Such procedure would allow the accused 
to speculate upon the supposed clemency of the 
judge, and, if his sentence or punishment were not 
13 
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as he hoped or believed it would be, to retract his 
plea and secure a trial before a jury. Pla~ntiff in 
error was well advised by counsel, and he should 
have known that the state's attorney, even if it 
is true that he promised he would recommend 
probation, is not the officer vested with the power 
of probation, but that it is entirely a function of 
the court. The court should, and often does, deny 
probation even though recommended by the state's 
attorney, where the facts show that the accused is 
an unsavory and habitual criminal." 
In United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3rd Cir. 1942), 
cert. den. 63 S.Ct. 74, the court denied relief where the 
prosecutor made an agreement and kept it. The court 
stated: 
''The agreement which was made by the pros-
ecuting authorities was fully kept. So we have a 
case where there was neither misunderstanding 
at the beginning of what was being agreed to, nor 
a failure thereafter to adhere to the agreement. 
It is not error to refuse leave to withdraw the plea 
if the defendant fully understood his rights, the 
nature of the charge against h~m, and the conse-
quences of such a plea." 
The fact that after judgment and sentence the de-
fendant claims innocence itself gives no basis for relief. 
People v. Moffett, 290 P.2d 667 (Cal.App.). Numerous 
cases and authorities support the conclusion that upon 
facts l~ke those presented in the instant case, no basis 
for relief can be claimed. People v. Griffi-n, 224 P.2d 47 
(Cal.App.); People v. McGee, 273 P.2d 883 (Cal.App.); 
Gleckma-n v. U-nited States, 16 F.2d 670 (8th Cir.); 
People v. Bacciocco, 81 Cal.App. 19, 251 P. 817 (where 
entry of plea was made upon promise by the prosecutor 
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that other charges would be dismissed, which promise 
"·as kept). It appears clear then that all the appellant's 
claim boils down to is hope of leniency coupled with 
advice of counsel. As is noted in 146 A.L.R. 1450: 
"As a general rule, reliance on advice of 
counsel in entering a plea of guilty is no ground 
for allowing ·withdrawal of same after judgment." 
And, at page 1442 : 
" [the] denial of a 1notion, made after judgment, 
to withdraw a plea of guilty, on the alleged 
ground, together with possibly others, that the 
plea of guilty was made in reliance upon the 
promise of len~ency by the court, prosecuting 
attorney, or other official, or by the defendant's 
own belief that he would receive a lighter sen-
tence by so pleading [does] not under the peculiar 
circumstances of the [cases] constitute an abuse 
of discretion or warrant reversal:" 
The appellant here seeks to accomplish the result 
that the court in Ex Parte Gutierrez, 265 P.2d 16 (Cal. 
A pp. 195±), warned against. There the court said : 
'' * * * A defendant charged with an offense can-
not be permitted to gamble on the anticipated 
result of a plea of guilty and when disappointed 
in the outcome reestablish a right to a trial. For 
aught that appear, the court was fully justified 
in refusing to vacate the guilty pleas." 
The appellant's case, when examined against the 
record and the applicable law, leads to the conclusion that 
the appellant has not sustained the burden he must carry 
of demonstrating an abuse of discretion by the trial 
judge. It appearing that no basis for a claim of abuse of 
discretion exists, the decision should be affirmed. State 
v. Lee Ltm, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record in the instant case reflects that the appel-
lant, a mature experienced person, who fully compre-
hended his situation, plead guilty with the hope of 
leniency. Having gambled with the chance of probation, 
appellant cannot now contend that because the trial 
judge felt that appellant should not receive his hope, he 
should now be allowed to gamble with a jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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